There is one other thing I will mention before I leave this branch of the discussion—although I do not consider it much of my business, any way.  I refer to that part of the Judge’s remarks where he undertakes to involve Mr. Buchanan in an inconsistency.  He reads something from Mr. Buchanan, from which he undertakes to involve him in an inconsistency; and he gets something of a cheer for having done so.  I would only remind the Judge that while he is very valiantly fighting for the Nebraska bill and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, it has been but a little while since he was the valiant advocate of the Missouri Compromise.  I want to know if Buchanan has not as much right to be inconsistent as Douglas has?  Has Douglas the exclusive right, in this country, of being on all sides of all questions?  Is nobody allowed that high privilege but himself?  Is he to have an entire monopoly on that subject?

So far as Judge Douglas addressed his speech to me, or so far as it was about me, it is my business to pay some attention to it.  I have heard the Judge state two or three times what he has stated to-day—that in a speech which I made at Springfield, Illinois, I had in a very especial manner complained that the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case had decided that a negro could never be a citizen of the United States.  I have omitted by some accident heretofore to analyze this statement, and it is required of me to notice it now.  In point of fact it is untrue.  I never have complained especially of the Dred Scott decision because it held that a negro could not be a citizen, and the Judge is always wrong when he says I ever did so complain of it.  I have the speech here, and I will thank him or any of his friends to show where I said that a negro should be a citizen, and complained especially of the Dred Scott decision because it declared he could not be one.  I have done no such thing, and Judge Douglas so persistently insisting that I have done so, has strongly impressed me with the belief of a predetermination on his part to misrepresent me.  He could not get his foundation for insisting that I was in favor of this negro equality any where else as well he could by assuming that untrue proposition.  Let me tell this audience what is true in regard to that matter; and the means by which they may correct me if I do not tell them truly is by a recurrence to the speech itself.  I spoke of the Dred Scott decision in my Springfield speech, and I was then endeavoring to prove that the Dred Scott decision was a portion of a system or scheme to make slavery national in this country.  I pointed out what things had been decided by the court.  I mentioned as a fact that they had decided that a negro could not be a citizen—that they had done so, as I supposed, to deprive the negro, under all circumstances, of the remotest possibility of ever becoming a citizen and claiming the rights of a citizen of the United States under a certain clause of the Constitution.  I stated that, without making any complaint of it at all.  I then went on and stated the other points decided in the case, namely: that the bringing of a negro into the State of Illinois and holding him in slavery for two years here was a matter in regard to which they would not decide whether it would make him free or not; that they decided the further point that taking him into a United States Territory where slavery was prohibited by act of Congress, did not make him free, because that act of Congress, as they held, was unconstitutional.  I mentioned these three things as making up the points decided in that case.  I mentioned them in a lump taken in connection with the introduction of the Nebraska bill, and the amendment of Chase, offered at the time, declaratory of the right of the people of the Territories to exclude slavery, which was voted down by the friends of the bill.  I mentioned all these things together, as evidence tending to prove a combination and conspiracy to make the institution of slavery national.  In that connection and in that way I mentioned the decision on the point that a negro could not be a citizen, and in no other connection.

Out of this, Judge Douglas builds up his beautiful fabrication—of my purpose to introduce a perfect, social, and political equality between the white and black races.  His assertion that I made an “especial objection” (that is his exact language) to the decision on this account, is untrue in point of fact.

Now, while I am upon this subject, and as Henry Clay has been alluded to, I desire to place myself, in connection with Mr. Clay, as nearly right before this people as may be.  I am quite aware what the Judge’s object is here by all these allusions.  He knows that we are before an audience, having strong sympathies southward by relationship, place of birth, and so on.  He desires to place me in an extremely Abolition attitude.  He read upon a former occasion, and alludes without reading today, to a portion of a speech which I delivered in Chicago.  In his quotations from that speech, as he has made them upon former occasions, the extracts were taken in such away as, I suppose, brings them within the definition of what is called garbling—taking portions of a speech which, when taken by themselves, do not present the entire sense of the speaker as expressed at the time.  I propose, therefore, out of that same speech, to show how one portion of it which he skipped over (taking an extract before and an extract after) will give a different idea, and the true idea I intended to convey.  It will take me some little time to read it, but I believe I will occupy the time that way.

You have heard him frequently allude to my controversy with him in regard to the Declaration of Independence.  I confess that I have had a struggle with Judge Douglas on that matter, and I will try briefly to place myself right in regard to it on this occasion.  I said—and it is between the extracts Judge Douglas has taken from this speech, and put in his published speeches:

“It may be argued that there are certain conditions that make necessities and impose them upon us, and to the extent that a necessity is imposed upon a man he must submit to it.  I think that was the condition in which we found ourselves when we established this Government.  We had slaves among us, we could not get our Constitution unless we permitted them to remain in slavery, we could not secure the good we did secure if we grasped for more; and having by necessity submitted to that much, it does not destroy the principle that is the charter of our liberties.  Let the charter remain as our standard.”

Now I have upon all occasions declared as strongly as Judge Douglas against the disposition to interfere with the existing institution of slavery.  You hear me read it from the same speech from which he takes garbled extracts for the purpose of proving upon me a disposition to interfere with the institution of slavery, and establish a perfect social and political equality between negroes and white people.

Allow me while upon this subject briefly to present one other extract from a speech of mine, more than a year ago, at Springfield, in discussing this very same question, soon after Judge Douglas took his ground that negroes were not included in the Declaration of Independence:

“I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did not mean to declare all men equal in all respects.  They did not mean to say all men were equal in color, size, intellect, moral development or social capacity.  They defined with tolerable distinctness in what they did consider all men created equal—equal in certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  This they said, and this they meant.  They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, or yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them.  In fact they had no power to confer such a boon.  They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit.

“They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to all: constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even, though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people, of all colors, every where.”

There again are the sentiments I have expressed in regard to the Declaration of Independence upon a former occasion—sentiments which have been put in print and read wherever anybody cared to know what so humble an individual as myself chose to say in regard to it.

At Galesburgh the other day, I said in answer to Judge Douglas, that three years ago there never had been a man, so far as I knew or believed, in the whole world, who had said that the Declaration of Independence did not include negroes in the term “all men.”  I reassert it to-day.  I assert that Judge Douglas and all his friends may search the whole records of the country, and it will be a matter of great astonishment to me if they shall be able to find that one human being three years ago had ever uttered the astounding sentiment that the term “all men” in the Declaration did not include the negro.  Do not let me be misunderstood.  I know that more then three years ago there were men who, finding this assertion constantly in the way of their schemes to bring about the ascendancy and perpetuation of slavery, denied the truth of it.  I know that Mr. Calhoun and all the politicians of his school denied the truth of the Declaration.  I know that it ran along in the mouth of some Southern men for a period of years, ending at last in that shameful though rather forcible declaration of Pettit of Indiana, upon the floor of the United States Senate, that the Declaration of Independence was in that respect “a self-evident lie,” rather than a self-evident truth.  But I say, with a perfect knowledge of all this hawking at the Declaration without directly attacking it, that three years ago there never had lived a man who had ventured to assail it in the sneaking way of pretending to believe it and then asserting it did not include the negro.  I believe the first man who ever said it was Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and the next to him was our friend, Stephen A.  Douglas.  And now it has become the catch-word of the entire party.  I would like to call upon his friends every where to consider how they have come in so short a time to view this matter in a way so entirely different from their former belief?  to ask whether they arc not being borne along by an irresistible current—whither, they know not?

In answer to my proposition at Galesburgh last week, I see that some man in Chicago has got up a letter addressed to the Chicago Times, to show, as he professes, that somebody had said so before; and he signs himself “An Old Line Whig,” if I remember correctly.  In the first place I would say he was not an old line Whig.  I am somewhat acquainted with old line Whigs.  I was with the old line Whigs from the origin to the end of that party; I became pretty well acquainted with them, and I know they always had some sense, whatever else you could ascribe to them.  I know there never was one who had not more sense than to try to show by the evidence he produces that some man had, prior to the time I named, said that negroes were not included in the term “all men” in the Declaration of Independence.  What is the evidence he produces?  I will bring forward his evidence and let you see what he offers by way of showing that somebody more than three years ago had said negroes were not included in the Declaration.  He brings forward part of a speech from Henry Clay—the part of the speech of Henry Clay which I used to bring forward to prove precisely the contrary.  I guess we are surrounded to some extent to-day by the old friends of Mr. Clay, and they will be glad to hear any thing from that authority.  While he was in Indiana a man presented a petition to liberate his negroes, and he (Mr. Clay) made a speech in answer to it, which I suppose he carefully wrote out himself and caused to be published.  I have before me an extract from that speech which constitutes the evidence this pretended “Old Line Whig” at Chicago brought forward to show that Mr. Clay didn’t suppose the negro was included in the Declaration of Independence.  Hear what Mr. Clay said:

“And what is the foundation of this appeal to me in Indiana, to liberate the slaves under my care in Kentucky?  It is a general declaration in the act announcing to the world the independence of the thirteen American colonies, that all men are created equal.  Now, as an abstract principle, there is no doubt of the truth of that declaration; and it is desirable, in the original construction of society, and in organized societies, to keep it in view as a great fundamental principle.  But, then, I apprehend that in no society that ever did exist, or ever shall be formed, was or can the equality asserted among the members of the human race, be practically enforced and carried out.  There are portions, large portions, women, minors, insane, culprits, transient sojourners, that will always probably remain subject to the government of another portion of the community.

“That declaration, whatever may be the extent of its import, was made by the delegations of the thirteen States.  In most of them slavery existed, and had long existed, and was established by law.  It was introduced and forced upon the colonies by the paramount law of England.  Do you believe, that in making that declaration the States that concurred in it intended that it should be tortured into a virtual emancipation of all the slaves within their respective limits?  Would Virginia and other Southern States have ever united in a declaration which was to be interpreted into an abolition of slavery among them?  Did any one of the thirteen colonies entertain such a design or expectation?  To impute such a secret and unavowed purpose, would be to charge a political fraud upon the noblest band of patriots that ever assembled in council—a fraud upon the Confederacy of the Revolution—a fraud upon the union of those States whose Constitution not only recognized the lawfulness of slavery, but permitted the importation of slaves from Africa until the year 1808.”

This is the entire quotation brought forward to prove that somebody previous to three years ago had said the negro was not included in the term “all men” in the Declaration.  How does it do so?  In what way has it a tendency to prove that?  Mr. Clay says it is true as an abstract principle that all men are created equal, but that we cannot practically apply it in all cases.  He illustrates this by bringing forward the cases of females, minors, and insane persons, with whom it cannot be enforced; but he says it is true as an abstract principle in the organization of society as well as in organized society, and it should be kept in view as a fundamental principle.  Let me read a few words more before I add some comments of my own.  Mr. Clay says a little further on:

“I desire no concealment of my opinions in regard to the institution of slavery.  I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we have derived it from the parental Government, and from our ancestors.  But here they are, and the question is, how can they be best dealt with?  If a state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundations of society, no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be, to incorporating the institution of slavery among its elements.”

Now, here in this same book—in this same speech—in this same extract brought forward to prove that Mr. Clay held that the negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence—no such statement on his part, but the declaration that it is a great fundamental truth, which should be constantly kept in view in the organization of society and in societies already organized.  But if I say a word about it—if I attempt, as Mr. Clay said all good men ought to do, to keep it in view—if, in this “organized society,” I ask to have the public eye turned upon it—if I ask, in relation to the organization of new Territories, that the public eye should be turned upon it—forthwith I am villified as you hear me to-day.  What have I done, that I have not the license of Henry Clay’s illustrious example here in doing?  Have I done aught that I have not his authority for, while maintaining that in organizing new Territories and societies, this fundamental principle should be regarded, and in organized society holding it up to the public view and recognizing what he recognized as the great principle of free government?

And when this new principle—this new proposition that no human being ever thought of three years ago—is brought forward, I combat it as having an evil tendency, if not an evil design.  I combat it as having a tendency to dehumanize the negro—to take away from him the right of ever striving to be a man.  I combat it as being one of the thousand things constantly done in these days to prepare the public mind to make property, and nothing but property, of the negro in all the States of this Union.

But there is a point that I wish, before leaving this part of the discussion, to ask attention to.  I have read and I repeat the words of Henry Clay:

“I desire no concealment of my opinions in regard to the institution of slavery.  I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we have derived it from the parental Government, and from our ancestors.  I wish every slave in the United States was in the country of his ancestors.  But here they are; the question is how they can best be dealt with?  If a state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundations of society, no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be, to incorporate the institution of slavery among its elements.”

The principle upon which I have insisted in this canvass, is in relation to laying the foundations of new societies.  I have never sought to apply these principles to the old States for the purpose of abolishing slavery in those States.  It is nothing but a miserable perversion of what I have said, to assume that I have declared Missouri, or any other slave State, shall emancipate her slaves.  I have proposed no such thing.  But when Mr. Clay says that in laying the foundations of societies in our Territories where it does not exist, he would be opposed to the introduction of slavery as an element, I insist that we have his warrant—his license for insisting upon the exclusion of that element which he declared in such strong and emphatic language was most hateful to him.

Judge Douglas has again referred to a Springfield speech in which I said “a house divided against itself cannot stand.”  The Judge has so often made the entire quotation from that speech that I can make it from memory.  I used this language:

“We are now far into the fifth year, since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to the slavery agitation.  Under the operation of this policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented.  In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed.  ‘A house divided against itself cannot stand.’ I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.  I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided.  It will become all one thing, or all the other.  Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it all become alike lawful in all the States—old as well as new, North as well as South.”

That extract and the sentiments expressed in it, have been extremely offensive to Judge Douglas.  He has warred upon them as Satan wars upon the Bible.  His perversions upon it are endless.  Here now are my views upon it in brief.

I said we were now far into the fifth year, since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to the slavery agitation.  Is it not so?  When that Nebraska bill was brought forward four years ago last January, was it not for the “avowed object” of putting an end to the slavery agitation?  We were to have no more agitation in Congress it was all to be banished to the Territories.  By the way, I will remark here that, as Judge Douglas is very fond of complimenting Mr. Crittenden in these days, Mr. Crittenden has said there was a falsehood in that whole business, for there was no slavery agitation at that time to allay.  We were for a little while quiet on the troublesome thing, and that very allaying plaster of Judge Douglas’s stirred it up again.  But was it not understood or intimated with the “confident promise” of putting an end to the slavery agitation?  Surely it was.  In every speech you heard Judge Douglas make, until he got into this “imbroglio,” as they call it, with the Administration about the Lecompton Constitution, every speech on that Nebraska bill was full of his felicitations that we were just at the end of the slavery agitation.  The last tip of the last joint of the old serpent’s tail was just drawing out of view.  But has it proved so?  I have asserted that under that policy that agitation “has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented.”  When was there ever a greater agitation in Congress than last winter?  When was it as great in the country as to-day?

There was a collateral object in the introduction of that Nebraska policy which was to clothe the people of the Territories with a superior degree of self-government, beyond what they had ever had before.  The first object and the main one of conferring upon the people a higher degree of “self-government,” is a question of fact to be determined by you in answer to a single question.  Have you ever heard or known of a people any where on earth who had as little to do, as, in the first instance of its use, the people of Kansas had with this same right of “self-government?”  In its main policy and in its collateral object, it has been nothing but a living creeping lie from the time of its introduction till to-day.

I have intimated that I thought the agitation would not cease until a crisis should have been reached and passed.  I have stated in what way I thought it would be reached and passed.  I have said that it might go one way or the other.  We might, by arresting the further spread of it, and placing it where the fathers originally placed it, put it where the public, mind should rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction.  Thus the agitation may cease.  It may be pushed forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.  I have said, and I repeat, my wish is that the further spread of it.  may be arrested, and that it may be placed where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction.  I have expressed that as my wish.  I entertain the opinion upon evidence sufficient to my mind, that the fathers of this Government placed that institution where the public mind did rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction.  Let me ask why they made provision that the source of slavery—the African slave-trade—should be cut off at the end of twenty years?  Why did they make provision that in all the new territory we owned at that time, slavery should be forever inhibited?  Why stop its spread in one direction and cut off its source in another, if they did not look to its being placed in the course of ultimate extinction?

Again; the institution of slavery is only mentioned in the Constitution of the United States two or three times, and in neither of these cases does the word “slavery” or “negro race” occur; but covert language is used each time, and for a purpose full of significance.  What is the language in regard to the prohibition of the African slave-trade?  It runs in about this way: “The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight.”

The next allusion in the Constitution to the question of slavery and the black race, is on the subject of the basis of representation, and there the language used is, “Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed—three-fifths of all other persons.”

It says “persons,” not slaves, not negroes; but this “three-fifths” can be applied to no other class among us than the negroes.

Lastly, in the provision for the reclamation of fugitive slaves, it is said: “No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.” There again there is no mention of the word “negro” or of slavery.  In all three of these places, being the only allusions to slavery in the instrument, covert language is used.  Language is used not suggesting that slavery existed or that the black race were among us.  And I understand the cotemporaneous history of those times to be that covert language was used with a purpose, and that purpose was that in our Constitution, which it was hoped and is still hoped will endure forever—when it should be read by intelligent and patriotic men, after the institution of slavery had passed from among us—there should be nothing on the face of the great charter of liberty suggesting that such a thing as negro slavery had ever existed among us.  This is part of the evidence that the fathers of the Government expected and intended the institution of slavery to come to an end.  They expected and intended that it should be in the course of ultimate extinction.  And when I say that I desire to see the further spread of it arrested, I only say I desire to see that done which the fathers have first done.  When I say I desire to see it placed where the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, I only say I desire to see it placed where they placed it.  It is not true that our fathers, as Judge Douglas assumes, made this Government part slave and part free.  Understand the sense in which he puts it.  He assumes that slavery is a rightful thing within itself-—was introduced by the framers of the Constitution.  The exact truth is, that they found the institution existing among us, and they left it as they found it.  But in making the Government they left this institution with many clear marks of disapprobation upon it.  They found slavery among them, and they left it among them because of the difficulty—the absolute impossibility of its immediate removal.  And when Judge Douglas asks me why we cannot let it remain part slave and part free, as the fathers of the Government made it, he asks a question based upon an assumption which is itself a falsehood; and I turn upon him and ask him the question, when the policy that the fathers of the Government had adopted in relation to this element among us was the best policy in the world—the only wise policy—the only policy that we can ever safely continue upon—that will ever give us peace, unless this dangerous element masters us all and becomes a national institution—I turn upon him and ask him why he could not leave it alone.  I turn and ask him why he was driven to the necessity of introducing a new policy in regard to it.  He has himself said he introduced a new policy.  He said so in his speech on the 22d of March of the present year, 1858.  I ask him why he could not let it remain where our fathers placed it.  I ask, too, of Judge Douglas and his friends why we shall not again place this institution upon the basis on which the fathers left it.  I ask you, when he infers that I am in favor of setting the free and slave States at war, when the institution was placed in that attitude by those who made the Constitution, did they make any war?  If we had no war out of it, when thus placed, wherein is the ground of belief that we shall have war out of it, if we return to that policy?  Have we had any peace upon this matter springing from any other basis?  I maintain that we have not.  I have proposed nothing more than a return to the policy of the fathers.

I confess, when I propose a certain measure of policy, it is not enough for me that I do not intend any thing evil in the result, but it is incumbent on me to show that it has not a tendency to that result.  I have met Judge Douglas in that point of view.  I have not only made the declaration that I do not mean to produce a conflict between the States, but I have tried to show by fair reasoning, and I think I have shown to the minds of fair men, that I propose nothing but what has a most peaceful tendency.  The quotation that I happened to make in that Springfield speech, that “a house divided against itself cannot stand,” and which has proved so offensive to the Judge, was part and parcel of the same thing.  He tries to show that variety in the domestic institutions of the different States is necessary and indispensable.  I do not dispute it.  I have no controversy with Judge Douglas about that.  I shall very readily agree with him that it would be foolish for us to insist upon having a cranberry law here, in Illinois, where we have no cranberries, because they have a cranberry law in Indiana, where they have cranberries.  I should insist that it would be exceedingly wrong in us to deny to Virginia the right to enact oyster laws, where they have oysters, because we want no such laws here.  I understand, I hope, quite as well as Judge Douglas or any body else, that the variety in the soil and climate and face of the country, and consequent variety in the industrial pursuits and productions of a country, require systems of law conforming to this variety in the natural features of the country.  I understand quite as well as Judge Douglas, that if we here raise a barrel of flour more than we want, and the Louisianians raise a barrel of sugar more than they want, it is of mutual advantage to exchange.  That produces commerce, brings us together, and makes us better friends.  We like one another the more for it.  And I understand as well as Judge Douglas, or any body else, that these mutual accommodations are the cements which bind together the different parts of this Union—that instead of being a thing to “divide the house”—figuratively expressing the Union—they tend to sustain it; they are the props of the house tending always to hold it up.

But when I have admitted all this, I ask if there is any parallel between these things and this institution of slavery?  I do not see that there is any parallel at all between them.  Consider it.  When have we had any difficulty or quarrel amongst ourselves about the cranberry laws of Indiana, or the oyster laws of Virginia, or the pine lumber laws of Maine, or the fact that Louisiana produces sugar, and Illinois flour?  When have we had any quarrels over these things?  When have we had perfect peace in regard to this thing which I say is an element of discord in this Union?  We have sometimes had peace, but when was it?  It was when the institution of slavery remained quiet where it was.  We have had difficulty and turmoil whenever it has made a struggle to spread itself where it was not.  I ask, then, if experience does not speak in thunder-tones, telling us that the policy which has given peace to the country heretofore, being returned to, gives the greatest promise of peace again.  You may say, and Judge Douglas has intimated the same thing, that all this difficulty in regard to the institution of slavery is the mere agitation of office-seekers and ambitious northern politicians.  He thinks we want to get “his place,” I suppose.  I agree that there are office-seekers amongst us.  The Bible says somewhere that we are desperately selfish.  I think we would have discovered that fact without the Bible.  I do not claim that I am any less so than the average of men, but I do claim that I am not more selfish than Judge Douglas.

But is it true that all the difficulty and agitation we have in regard to this institution of slavery springs from office-seeking—from the mere ambition of politicians?  Is that the truth?  How many times have we had danger from this question?  Go back to the day of the Missouri Compromise.  Go back to the Nullification question, at the bottom of which lay this same slavery question.  Go back to the time of the Annexation of Texas.  Go back to the troubles that led to the Compromise of 1850.  You will find that every time, with the single exception of the Nullification question, they sprung from an endeavor to spread this institution.  There never was a party in the history of this country, and there probably never will be, of sufficient strength to disturb the general peace of the country.  Parties themselves may be divided and quarrel on minor questions, yet it extends not beyond the parties themselves.  But does not this question make a disturbance outside of political circles?  Does it not enter into the churches and rend them asunder?  What divided the great Methodist Church into two parts, North and South?  What has raised this constant disturbance in every Presbyterian General Assembly that meets?  What disturbed the Unitarian Church in this very city two years ago?  What has jarred and shaken the great American Tract Society recently, not yet splitting it, but sure to divide it in the end?  Is it not this same mighty, deep-seated power that somehow operates on the minds of men, exciting and stirring them up in every avenue of society—in politics, in religion, in literature, in morals, in all the manifold relations of life?  Is this the work of politicians?  Is that irresistible power which for fifty years has shaken the Government and agitated the people to be stilled and subdued by pretending that it is an exceedingly simple thing, and we ought not to talk about it?  If you will get every body else to stop talking about it, I assure you I will quit before they have half done so.  But where is the philosophy or statesmanship which assumes that you can quiet that disturbing element in our society which has disturbed us for more than half a century, which has been the only serious danger that has threatened our institutions—I say, where is the philosophy or the statesmanship based on the assumption that we are to quit talking about it, and that the public mind is all at once to cease being agitated by it?  Yet this is the policy here in the north that Douglas is advocating—that we are to care nothing about it!  I ask you if it is not a false philosophy?  Is it not a false statesmanship that undertakes to build up a system of policy upon the basis of caring nothing about the very thing that every body does care the most about?—a thing which all experience has shown we care a very great deal about?

The Judge alludes very often in the course of his remarks to the exclusive right which the States have to decide the whole thing for themselves.  I agree with him very readily that the different States have that right.  He is but fighting a man of straw when he assumes that I am contending against the right of the States to do as they please about it.  Our controversy with him is in regard to the new Territories.  We agree that when the States come in as States they have the right and the power to do as they please.  We have no power as citizens of the free States or in our federal capacity as members of the Federal Union through the General Government, to disturb slavery in the States where it exists.  We profess constantly that we have no more inclination than belief in the power of the Government to disturb it; yet we are driven constantly to defend ourselves from the assumption that we are warring upon the rights of the States.  What I insist upon is, that the new Territories shall be kept free from it while in the Territorial condition.  Judge Douglas assumes that we have no interest in them—that we have no right whatever to interfere.  I think we have some interest.  I think that as white men we have.  Do we not wish for an outlet for our surplus population, if I may so express myself?  Do we not feel an interest in getting to that outlet with such institutions as we would like to have prevail there?  If you go to the Territory opposed to slavery and another man comes upon the same ground with his slave, upon the assumption that the things are equal, it turns out that he has the equal right all his way and you have no part of it your way.  If he goes in and makes it a slave Territory, and by consequence a slave State, is it not time that those who desire to have it a free State were on equal ground.  Let me suggest it in a different way.  How many Democrats are there about here [“A thousand”] who have left slave States and come into the free State of Illinois to get rid of the institution of slavery?  [Another voice—“A thousand and one.”] I reckon there are a thousand and one.  I will ask you, if the policy you are now advocating had prevailed when this country was in a Territorial condition, where would you have gone to get rid of it?  Where would you have found your free State or Territory to go to?  And when hereafter, for any cause, the people in this place shall desire to find new homes, if they wish to be rid of the institution, where will they find the place to go to?

Now irrespective of the moral aspect of this question as to whether there is a right or wrong in enslaving a negro, I am still in favor of our new Territories being in such a condition that white men may find a home—may find some spot where they can better their condition—where they can settle upon new soil and better their condition in life.  I am in favor of this not merely (I must say it here as I have elsewhere) for our own people who are born amongst us, but as an outlet for free white people every where, the world over—in which Hans and Baptiste and Patrick, and all other men from all the world, may find new homes and better their conditions in life.

I have stated upon former occasions, and I may as well state again, what I understand to be the real issue in this controversy between Judge Douglas and myself.  On the point of my wanting to make war between the free and the slave States, there has been no issue between us.  So, too, when he assumes that I am in favor of introducing a perfect social and political equality between the white and black races.  These are false issues, upon which Judge Douglas has tried to force the controversy.  There is no foundation in truth for the charge that I maintain either of these propositions.  The real issue in this controversy—the one pressing upon every mind—is the sentiment on the part of one class that looks upon the institution of slavery as a wrong, and of another class that does not look upon it as a wrong.  The sentiment that contemplates the institution of slavery in this country as a wrong is the sentiment of the Republican party.  It is the sentiment around which all their actions—all their arguments circle—from which all their propositions radiate.  They look upon it as being a moral, social and political wrong; and while they contemplate it as such, they nevertheless have due regard for its actual existence among us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way and to all the constitutional obligations thrown about it.  Yet having a due regard for these, they desire a policy in regard to it that looks to its not creating any more danger.  They insist that it should as far as may be, be treated as a wrong, and one of the methods of treating it as a wrong is to make provision that it shall grow no larger.  They also desire a policy that looks to a peaceful end of slavery at sometime, as being wrong.  These are the views they entertain in regard to it as I understand them; and all their sentiments—all their arguments and propositions are brought within this range.  I have said and I repeat it here, that if there be a man amongst us who does not think that the institution of slavery is wrong in any one of the aspects of which I have spoken, he is misplaced and ought not to be with us.  And if there be a man amongst us who is so impatient of it as a wrong as to disregard its actual presence among us and the difficulty of getting rid of it suddenly in a satisfactory way, and to disregard the constitutional obligations thrown about it, that man is misplaced if he is on our platform.  We disclaim sympathy with him in practical action.  He is not placed properly with us.

On this subject of treating it as a wrong, and limiting its spread, let me say a word.  Has any thing ever threatened the existence of this Union save and except this very institution of slavery?  What is it that we hold most dear amongst us?  Our own liberty and prosperity.  What has ever threatened our liberty and prosperity save and except this institution of slavery?  If this is true, how do you propose to improve the condition of things by enlarging slavery—by spreading it out and making it bigger?  You may have a wen or cancer upon your person and not be able to cut it out lest you bleed to death; but surely it is no way to cure it, to engraft it and spread it over your whole body.  That is no proper way of treating what you regard a wrong.  You see this peaceful way of dealing with it as a wrong—restricting the spread of it, and not allowing it to go into new countries where it has not already existed.  That is the peaceful way, the old-fashioned way, the way in which the fathers themselves set us the example.

On the other hand, I have said there is a sentiment which treats it as not being wrong.  That is the Democratic sentiment of this day.  I do not mean to say that every man who stands within that range positively asserts that it is right.  That class will include all who positively assert that it is right, and all who like Judge Douglas treat it as indifferent and do not say it is either right or wrong.  These two classes of men fall within the general class of those who do not look upon it as a wrong.  And if there be among you any body who supposes that he, as a Democrat can consider himself “as much opposed to slavery as anybody,” I would like to reason with him.  You never treat it as a wrong.  What other thing that you consider as a wrong, do you deal with as you deal with that?  Perhaps you say it is wrong, but your leader never does, and you quarrel with any body who says it is wrong.  Although you pretend to say so yourself you can find no fit place to deal with it as a wrong.  You must not say any thing about it in the free States, because it is not here.  You must not say any thing about it in the slave States, because it is there.  You must not say any thing about it in the pulpit, because that is religion and has nothing to do with it.  You must not say any thing about it in politics, because that will disturb the security of “my place.”  There is no place to talk about it as being a wrong, although you say yourself it is a wrong.  But finally you will screw yourself up to the belief that if the people of the slave States should adopt a system of gradual emancipation on the slavery question, you would be in favor of it.  You would be in favor of it.  You say that is getting it in the right place, and you would be glad to see it succeed.  But you are deceiving yourself.  You all know that Frank Blair and Gratz Brown, down there in St.  Louis, undertook to introduce that system in Missouri.  They fought as valiantly as they could for the system of gradual emancipation which you pretend you would be glad to see succeed.  Now I will bring you to the test.  After a hard fight they were beaten, and when the news came over here you threw up your hats and hurraed for Democracy.  More than that, take all the argument made in favor of the system you have proposed, and it carefully excludes the idea that there is any thing wrong in the institution of slavery.  The arguments to sustain that policy carefully excluded it.  Even here to-day you heard Judge Douglas quarrel with me because I uttered a wish that it might sometime come to an end.  Although Henry Clay could say he wished every slave in the United States was in the country of his ancestors, I am denounced by those pretending to respect Henry Clay for uttering a wish that it might sometime, in some peaceful way, come to an end.  The Democratic policy in regard to that institution will not tolerate the merest breath, the slightest hint, of the least degree of wrong about it.  Try it by some of Judge Douglas’s arguments.  He says he “don’t care whether it is voted up or voted down” in the Territories.  I do not care myself in dealing with that expression, whether it is intended to be expressive of his individual sentiments on the subject, or only of the national policy he desires to have established.  It is alike valuable for my purpose.  Any man can say that who does not see anything wrong in slavery, but no man can logically say it who does see a wrong in it; because no man can logically say he don’t care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down.  He may say he don’t care whether an indifferent thing is voted up or down, but he must logically have a choice between a right thing and a wrong thing.  He contends that whatever community wants slaves has a right to have them.  So they have if it is not a wrong.  But if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right to do wrong.  He says that upon the score of equality, slaves should be allowed to go in a new Territory, like other property.  This is strictly logical if there is no difference between it and other property.  If it and other property are equal, his argument is entirely logical.  But if you insist that one is wrong and the other right, there is no use to institute a comparison between right and wrong.  You may turnover every thing in the Democratic policy from beginning to end, whether in the shape it takes on the statute book, in the shape it takes in the Dred Scott decision, in the shape it takes in conversation, or the shape it takes in short maxim-like arguments—it every where carefully excludes the idea that there is any thing wrong in it.

That is the real issue.  That is the issue that will continue in this country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent.  It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right and wrong—throughout the world.  They are the two principles that have stood face to face from the beginning of time; and will ever continue to struggle.  The one is the common right of humanity and the other the divine right of kings.  It is the same principle in whatever shape it develops itself.  It is the same spirit that says, “You work and toil and earn bread, and I’ll eat it.”  No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle.  I was glad to express my gratitude at Quincy, and I re-express it here to Judge Douglas—that he looks to no end of the institution of slavery.  That will help the people to see where the struggle really is.  It will here after place with us all men who really do wish the wrong may have an end.  And whenever we can get rid of the fog which obscures the real question—when we can get Judge Douglas and his friends to avow a policy looking to its perpetuation—we can get out from among that class of men and bring them to the side of those who treat it as a wrong.  Then there will soon be an end of it, and that end will be its “ultimate extinction.”  Whenever the issue can be distinctly made, and all extraneous matter thrown out so that men can fairly see the real difference between the parties, this controversy will soon be settled, and it will be done peaceably too.  There will be no war, no violence.  It will be placed again where the wisest and best men of the world placed it.  Brooks of South Carolina once declared that when this Constitution was framed, its framers did not look to the institution existing until this day.  When he said this, I think he stated a fact that is fully borne out by the history of the times.  But he also said they were better and wiser men than the men of these days; yet the men of these days had experience which they had not, and by the invention of the cotton-gin it became a necessity in this country that slavery should be perpetual.  I now say that, willingly or unwillingly, purposely or without purpose, Judge Douglas has been the most prominent instrument in changing the position of the institution of slavery which the fathers of the Government expected to come to an end ere this—and putting it upon Brooks’s cotton-gin basis—placing it where he openly confesses he has no desire there shall ever be an end of it.

I understand I have ten minutes yet.  I will employ it in saying something about this argument Judge Douglas uses, while he sustains the Dred Scott decision, that the people of the Territories can still somehow exclude slavery.  The first thing I ask attention to is the fact that Judge Douglas constantly said, before the decision, that whether they could or not, was a question for the Supreme Court.  But after the court has made the decision he virtually says it is not a question for the Supreme Court, but for the people.  And how is it he tells us they can exclude it?  He says it needs “police regulations,” and that admits of “unfriendly legislation.”  Although it is a right established by the Constitution of the United States to take a slave into a Territory of the United States and hold him as property, yet unless the Territorial Legislature will give friendly legislation, and, more especially, if they adopt unfriendly legislation, they can practically exclude him.  Now, without meeting this proposition as a matter of fact, I pass to consider the real Constitutional obligation.  Let me take the gentleman who looks me in the face before me, and let us suppose that he is a member of the Territorial Legislature.  The first thing he will do will be to swear that he will support the Constitution of the United States.  His neighbor by his side in the Territory has slaves and needs Territorial legislation to enable him to enjoy that Constitutional right.  Can he withhold the legislation which his neighbor needs for the enjoyment of a right which is fixed in his favor in the Constitution of the United States which he has sworn to support?  Can he withhold it without violating his oath?  And more especially, can he pass unfriendly legislation to violate his oath?  Why, this is a monstrous sort of talk about the Constitution of the United States!  There has never been as outlandish or lawless a doctrine from the mouth of any respectable man on earth.  I do not believe it is a Constitutional right to hold slaves in a Territory of the United States.  I believe the decision was improperly made and I go for reversing it.  Judge Douglas is furious against those who go for reversing a decision.  But he is for legislating it out of all force while the law itself stands.  I repeat that there has never been so monstrous a doctrine uttered from the mouth of a respectable man.

I suppose most of us (I know it of myself) believe that the people of the Southern States are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave law—that is a right fixed in the Constitution.  But it cannot be made available to them without Congressional legislation.  In the Judge’s language, it is a “barren right” which needs legislation before it can become efficient and valuable to the persons to whom it is guarantied.  And as the right is Constitutional I agree that the legislation shall be granted to it—and that not that we like the institution of slavery.  We profess to have no taste for running and catching niggers—at least I profess no taste for that job at all.  Why then do I yield support to a Fugitive Slave law?  Because I do not understand that the Constitution, which guaranties that right, can be supported without it.  And if I believed that the right to hold a slave in a Territory was equally fixed in the Constitution with the right to reclaim fugitives, I should be bound to give it the legislation necessary to support it.  I say that no man can deny his obligation to give the necessary legislation to support slavery in a Territory, who believes it is a Constitutional right to have it there.  No man can, who does not give the Abolitionists an argument to deny the obligation enjoined by the Constitution to enact a Fugitive Slave law.  Try it now.  It is the strongest Abolition argument ever made.  I say if that Dred Scott decision is correct, then the right to hold slaves in a Territory is equally a Constitutional right with the right of a slaveholder to have his runaway returned.  No one can show the distinction between them.  The one is express, so that we cannot deny it.  The other is construed to be in the Constitution, so that he who believes the decision to be correct believes in the right.  And the man who argues that by unfriendly legislation, in spite of that Constitutional right, slavery may be driven from the Territories, cannot avoid furnishing an argument by which Abolitionists may deny the obligation to return fugitives, and claim the power to pass laws unfriendly to the right of the slaveholder to reclaim his fugitive.  I do not know how such an argument may strike a popular assembly like this, but I defy any body to go before a body of men whose minds are educated to estimating evidence and reasoning, and show that there is an iota of difference between the Constitutional right to reclaim a fugitive, and the Constitutional right to hold a slave, in a Territory, provided this Dred Scott decision is correct.  I defy any man to make an argument that will justify unfriendly legislation to deprive a slaveholder of his right to hold his slave in a Territory, that will not equally, in all its length, breadth and thickness, furnish an argument for nullifying the Fugitive Slave law.  Why, there is not such an Abolitionist in the nation as Douglas, after all.